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1 Introduction
There exists plenty of empirical evidence that banks do earn rents (e.g. Fama,
1985, Cosimano and McDonald, 1998, Molyneux et al., 1994; and the wave of
recent bank mergers). In this paper we will contrast, within a unified modeling
framework, the two main theoretical explanations put forth in the literature, and
test their empirical validity.
A stream of literature (e.g. Leland and Pyle, 1977, Fama, 1985, Broecker,
1990, Sharpe, 1990) suggests that banks’ raison d’etre is to collect and analyze
information, or information acquisition as we will call it. Banks could for exam-
ple, as in Broecker’s model, test customers for their creditworthiness in order to
avoid adverse selection. Such actions (learning the customer’s type) gives a bank
bargaining power that it can translate into a larger share of the surplus. An equally
old and plentiful (e.g. Klein, 1971, Degryse, 1996) literature argues that banks’
source of rents stems from industrial organization-type sources of an oligopolisti-
cally small number of firms, product differentiation, and/or price discrimination
(that is not based on customer risk characteristics).
1 These sources of rents we will
henceforth call market power. As far as we know, only the latter of these two ex-
planations has been tested empirically (e.g. Spiller and Favaro, 1984).
2
Whether banks are engaged in one or the other activity may have large con-
sequences outside the industry itself: a large literature suggests that banks’
(in)ability to solve informational problems affects the severity of the effects of
macro-level shocks (e.g. Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993, Holmstrom and Tirole,
                                                
1  See Freixas and Rochet (1997) for a comprehensive treatment of both literatures.
2  There is of course an enormous empirical literature on banking. To the best of our knowledge,
however, these papers are not concerned with the questions studied here. A paper by Petersen and
Rajan (1994) comes close in that they study the effects of long-term relationship on terms of
credit.4
1997). It is therefore of first rate importance to know whether, and through which
mechanisms banks collect and process information. There exists indirect evidence
that banks are indeed acquiring information (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, James,
1987, Toivanen and Cressy, 1998, Mester et al., 1998), but little or no direct evi-
dence.
3 The main objective of this paper is to provide the first direct test of (the
means of) information acquisition in banking.
A common feature of information acquisition and market power is that they
both most likely necessitate sunk investments (but see Petersen and Rajan, 1994,
and Section 4). Notwithstanding recent investments in electronic banking, the
most obvious such investments of commercial banks are their branch network,
and the human capital of their employees. We argue that branches and human
capital can serve two purposes. They can either be investments in information
acquisition, (and/) or investments in market power. Acquiring information neces-
sitates personnel who can collect and analyze it, and investments in human capital
increase the capability of a bank’s personnel to deal with these tasks. Information
is often local, and therefore a local presence (in the form of a branch) may facili-
tate the collection of such information.
4 But equally plausibly, one could argue
that a large branch network enables the bank, through either horizontal (providing
services close by to a larger clientele) or vertical (by providing a denser network
of services to a given customer) product differentiation, to increase its price-cost
margins. Likewise, a better-trained and educated workforce may lead to a higher
                                                
3  Petersen and Rajan find that firms with longer bank relationships have better access to credit.
James finds that the stock market reacts favorably to news about new bank loans. Toivanen and
Cressy cannot reject the Null of symmetric information when testing the determinants of loan
contracts, and attribute this to bank information acquisition. Mester, independently from us, finds
that checking accounts provide banks with information about the riskiness of loans.
4 We’ve been told that in the 70’s and 80’s, a Finnish bank’s policy was that its local managers
have to become members of either the local Lion’s, or Rotary’s. Although this can partially be
explained by them being able to attract business in this way, an alternative explanation is that they
were thus in a position to better gather local information.5
(perceived) level of quality of the service provided, with similar consequences. A
third motivation for sunk costs arises from the deposit side. By offering deposit
customers more conveniently located and/or faster services, a bank may be able to
attract deposits at lower interest rates. This is an interesting proposition that war-
rants better attention than is possible within the scope of this paper. We do not
model the deposit side explicitly in this paper, but control for the deposit interest
rate(s) in the empirical model by treating it as an endogenous explanatory vari-
able.
Our modeling framework encompasses two sub-models, a monitoring model
and a product differentiation model, and is based on earlier work (Williamson,
1986, 1987, Shaked and Sutton, 1982). In the monitoring model, a bank can ac-
quire a monitoring technology that can be used to test loan applicants for a pay-off
relevant characteristic. The nature of the debt contract is such that it allows banks
“to focus their attention on information gathering to a particular set of issues:
those associated with the probability of default and the net worth of the firm in
those low-return states” (Stiglitz 1985, p. 143). Therefore, the idea here is simply
that the banks can spend resources in order to be able to inspect the entrepreneurs
before granting loans and thereby produce information about the liquidity of the
project in the state of default.
5 The ability to increase loan receipts in states of
default, i.e., to enhance the recovery rate of loans, can have important ramifica-
tions; in the Stiglitz-Weiss -type credit-rationing framework of Rousseau (1998)
for instance, it leads to a lower loan-deposit spread and eventually to financial
deepening. The recovery rate of loans is also an important input in modern credit
risk models, such as J.P. Morgan’s CreditMetrics or Credit Suisse’s CreditRisk
+.
                                                
5 Wang and Williamson (1998) argue (and provide casual evidence) that such ex ante monitoring
involves larger investments than ex post monitoring (costly state verification).6
The second version of the model is a product differentiation model close in spirit
to Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983), aimed at capturing a variety of frictions in
bank customer mobility. The differentiation is thought to reflect financial service
quality, bank-customer relationships and/or switching costs, though it could alter-
natively be interpreted as a combined model of differentiation and interim bank
monitoring. In this model, banks can invest in activities that increase (decrease)
the utility that entrepreneurial customers derive from buying their products (or
from being in control of a project).
After having presented the two theoretical models we build an econometric
model that encompasses both; and test the models’ predictions using data from
Finnish cooperative banks. These banks are small local banks operating in geo-
graphically distinct, non-overlapping markets. They share several common fea-
tures like the ownership form, and a quasi-central bank. As a group, they have by
far the largest branch network, suggesting that they have made sunk investments.
Although these banks share many features and institutions, they operate inde-
pendently. The common features, discussed in more detail in Section 3, suggest
that they use e.g. their branches for the same purpose, be it information acquisi-
tion or market power. This is important in that our model suggests that banks can
in equilibrium be either non-monitors or monitors, or have either high or low
quality. A random sample of banks might lead to wrong inference of the role of
sunk costs. Essentially, having banks that have a common mode of operation and
that operate in separate markets enables us to identify empirically the role of sunk
costs.
6 Variation in local conditions across regions, and within regions over time
                                                
6  One way to deal with this would be to estimate different equations for monitoring and non-
monitoring banks using e.g. switching regressions.7
(see Section 3) allows us to measure the effect of branches and personnel on bank
performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next Section, we
present and solve the two theoretical models, and discuss their empirical implica-
tions. We wish to emphasize that the models are purposefully rather stylized. Ac-
cordingly, they are to be regarded as examples of formal models from which the
(general) hypotheses tested in the empirical part can be generated. In Section 3,
we present and discuss the data. Section 4 provides our econometrics, and empiri-
cal results. In Section 5 we offer brief conclusions.
2 The Theoretical Model
2.1 The Modeling Framework
Consider a universally risk-neutral economy with two banks and a continuum of
entrepreneurs distributed (with unit density) over a compact subset D of 
2 ￿ . Each
entrepreneur has an initial endowment of W > 0 which she can invest either in a
safe project providing a payoff W
* > W, or in a risky project requiring an initial
investment of size K > W. If the risky project is undertaken, it yields a random
cash flow X. To initiate the risky project, an entrepreneur must raise finance K -
W ” 1. The two banks are the only source of outside finance for entrepreneurs in
this economy and the banks are only willing to buy standard debt contracts, de-
noted by a pair (1, R), where 1 is loan size and R is the entrepreneur’s payment if
the project succeeds. The safe and risky projects are mutually exclusive. Banks
obtain loanable funds at a constant cost denoted r.
The cash flows generated by the risky projects are drawn from the same
probability distribution for all entrepreneurs. We denote with x the realized return8
of a project; with f(x) and F(x) respectively the probability density (pdf) and cu-
mulative density functions (cdf) of this distribution. The distribution f(x) is as-
sumed to be positive and differentiable on [0, ¥). As in Williamson (1986, 1987),
a cash flow realization x is costlessly observable to each entrepreneur whereas a
bank can observe it only by paying an auditing cost. We further assume that de-
spite auditing the bank can confiscate only x - v, v ‡ 0, where v represents a leak
to outsiders (plus the auditing cost) in states where the entrepreneur fails to meet
her debt service obligation. The amount of this leak varies over the cross-section
of entrepreneurs and banks know (for free) only the distribution of v (see below).
One may think of v as a determinant of the recovery rate of loans and/or bank-
ruptcy costs, i.e., general liquidation costs, legal fees, costs of selling specialized
equipment and other costs that are deducted from the proceeds that should go to
debtors. Borrowers cannot credibly reveal the value of v to lenders.
We assume that the continuum of observationally identical entrepreneurs
consists of types that can be characterized by an ordered pair (v, q), where q ‡ 0.
Thus, firstly, the entrepreneurs differ w.r.t. v, the payments made to third parties
in bankruptcy states. In particular, v is distributed according to marginal pdf g(v)
with cdf G(v), and has support [ ] . 0   , , 0 > v v  Secondly, the entrepreneurs value the
quality and availability of bank services. The extent to which an entrepreneur val-
ues them depends on a characteristic q which is a non-negative real number. It is
assumed that this parameter is distributed according to marginal pdf z(q) with cdf
Z(q) on [ ] . 0   , , 0 > q q
A complementary interpretation for q is that the project generates, besides
the random and eventually verifiable cash flow, a sure, non-verifiable and non-
assignable control rent that varies over the cross-section of borrowers. In such a
model, bank quality is then to be interpreted as the tightness of bank’s interim9
monitoring. The more intensively a bank monitors its client during the lending
relationship, the less the borrower can enjoy the control rents that running an en-
trepreneurial project generates. Though combined effects (of financial service
quality and interim monitoring) are likely to be present in actual borrowing deci-
sions, we shall for brevity stick to the product differentiation interpretation in
what follows.
The following assumptions hold throughout the analysis:
Assumption A1. The random cash flows are drawn from an Exponential distri-
bution, i.e., X ~ Exp(l) with support [0, ¥) and the expected value E(x).
Assumption A2. The characteristics q and v are statistically independent. In this
economy, each possible value of the two parameters v and q is realized, and G(v ˆ)
and Z(qˆ) are the fractions of entrepreneurs with v and q parameter values v £ v ˆ
and q £ q ˆ, respectively. The marginal distribution for q and v is a Uniform distri-
bution, i.e., q ~ U[0,q ] and v ~ U[ ] v , 0 .
7
To complete the description of our general modeling framework, we model
a two-stage game. In the first stage, banks enter simultaneously and can make a
costly investment of fixed size. If made, this (sunk) investment either allows them
to test customers for their v, or to produce a high(er) quality service. In the second
stage, banks compete for entrepreneurs by announcing independently -but se-
quentially- their loan interest rates. We assume that in this stage, whenever the
banks’ first stage decisions are not identical, the bank who made a (larger) sunk
                                                
7 We would like to emphasize the following: Assumption A1 is imposed for the sake of concrete-
ness. This seems justifiable since on the one hand, our analysis does not seem to be particularly
dependent on the specific form of f(x) we postulate. On the other hand, the cost of using a general
f(x) (with certain restrictions) is that explicit expressions for equilibrium interest rates cannot be
derived. Though the independence assumption (Assumption A2) has no relevance in the monitor-
ing model, it does simplify the product differentiation model in the sense that the provision of
higher quality banking services does not affect the expected bankruptcy costs in a bank’s loan
portfolio.10
investment, gets to move first with probability a, i.e., to announce its interest
rate(s). The other bank is then able to observe these, takes them as given and
chooses its own interest rate(s). With probability (1-a) the roles are reversed.
Sequential second stage competition is adopted since no pure strategy Nash equi-
librium exists in a simultaneous move loan pricing game with (asymmetrically)
monitoring banks (for a model exhibiting a similar feature with partially overlap-
ping customer classifications, see Broecker, 1990). As we will see, the realization
of these leader-follower roles will play a major part in the equilibrium strategies
of the banks. We begin with the monitoring model and thereafter analyze the
Shaked-Sutton type model of vertical product differentiation.
2.2 The Monitoring Model
We first describe the nature of the monitoring technology and then derive Nash
equilibrium loan pricing strategies as a function of banks’ monitoring invest-
ments, and conditional on the realization of the leader-follower roles. Finally, we
characterize the sub-game perfect monitoring decisions.
The Monitoring Technology: In order to keep the analysis tractable, we
will restrict ourselves to a dichotomous monitoring variable which takes either the
value s
m > 0, or 0. When this investment is made, two classes of entrepreneurs are
created: categories for the good (G) and the bad (B) entrepreneurs. Specifically,
by paying a strictly positive fixed fee C
m, the bank can identify whether an entre-
preneur is of better or of worse type than s
m,
8 implying that the interval [ ] v , 0  is
                                                
8 The threshold s
m is common to both banks.11
divided into two subintervals by the insertion of point s
m such that  v s
m < < 0 .
9
Note in particular that in this Section no quality difference between banks
emerges. We therefore normalize the level of banks’ service quality to zero.
The above implies that there are two possibilities to consider: A bank hav-
ing no monitoring ability (NM-bank) must treat its customer population as a sin-
gle entity,  B G GB ¨ ” , to whom it quotes a single rate  NM R  (one plus interest
rate). A monitoring bank (M-bank) is able to tell whether a given entrepreneur
belongs to G or to B, and it could therefore quote two distinct interest rates:
B M G M R R , ,   and   , one for each entrepreneur category. Let v(p) denote the average
(expected) v in entrepreneur category p = {B, GB, G}. Clearly, for s
m > 0, we have
) ( ) ( ) ( B v GB v G v < < .
We make the following technical assumption to simplify the analysis:
Assumption A3. In case both banks offer the same interest rate, an entrepreneur
chooses with probability one the bank that has allocated her to a better category.
If she is labeled identically by both banks, and the banks charge the same interest
rate, she chooses a particular bank with probability ½.
The banks are not allowed to cross-subsidize between entrepreneur groups.
It is further assumed that if a bank has invested in ex ante monitoring, it carries
out its evaluation and truthfully reports the monitoring result to each entrepreneur
                                                
9 Of course, alternative assumptions on the nature of the monitoring technology could also be
made. For instance, allowing for more entrepreneur categories (to be created similarly by both
banks) would enlarge the strategy space a bank can consider when setting (specific) rates for dif-
ferent customer categories. However, this extension would increase the length of analysis via in-
creasing the number of cases that would need to be considered both in Stages 1 and 2 of the game.
Moreover, if in this environment a bank can acquire a technology which allows it to create another
category, the analysis would correspond very closely to that pursued in this paper. Another alter-
native would be to postulate a continuous monitoring variable such that, say, all good entrepre-
neurs with a small v could be perfectly identified. Not surprisingly, this creates technical problems
as a bank no longer chooses a finite number of interest rates but rather designs an optimal interest
rate offer function during the second stage of the game. In particular, when acting as the price
leader, the design of such an offer function is rather involved and thus beyond the scope of the
present paper.12
before announcing its loan rates. However, the banks cannot observe the outcome
of the monitoring activity of their competitor, and a monitoring report by a rival
bank is not verifiable. Thus, an entrepreneur cannot credibly reveal the monitoring
outcome (loan offer) of bank i to bank j. Note that ex ante monitoring reduces
neither the ex post need for auditing nor the costs associated with it.
Loan Pricing Under Symmetric Monitoring Investments: If both banks
invest in monitoring, competition will be Bertrand (with homogenous goods) in
both entrepreneur groups B and G; the situation is similar if neither bank invests
in monitoring, the only difference being that both banks only offer one interest
rate applying to all borrowers. Because of Bertrand competition, each bank is
forced to compute the most competitive interest rate offer it can possibly make for
the entrepreneurs in category p as
R
R R e x E dx x f R x R
l m
- ¥
= - =￿ ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( max (1)
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where m(R) is the expected utility of an entrepreneur, n(p) = (1-G(s
m)) if p = B
and n(p) = G(s
m) if p = G and p(R,v(p)) is a bank’s return from loans granted at
rate R to entrepreneurs in category p. Note that  0 ) ( ' < - =
- R e R
l m  and
0 )) ( ) ( ( )) ( , ( ' > - =
- R e p v x E p v R
l l p . Thus, unlike in Williamson (1987), there is
no credit rationing despite the presence of costs in verifying adverse project out-
comes.
An entrepreneur’s participation constraint is satisfied as long as the rate
charged is below a “monopoly” rate, R
*, given by
) / ) ( ln( ) (
* * W x E x E R =   (2)13
where (by assumption) 
* ) ( W x E > . In order to ensure that the banks’ individual
rationality constraint is not violated for any entrepreneur category (if financed at

















This condition ensures that entry deterrence is not a feasible form of pre-emptive
market behavior. It is also sufficient to ensure the logical consistency of the zero
profit interest rate, 
0
) ( p v R , defined as the interest rate at which a bank financing
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for p ˛ {GB, G, B}.
As competition is Bertrand, both banks announce 
0
) ( p v R  for each conceivable
p. Since both banks offer the same interest rate, and it is the lowest an entrepre-
neur is offered, a particular bank is chosen with probability ½. Clearly, the banks
make zero expected profits.
Loan Pricing Under Asymmetric Monitoring Investments: The M-bank
has more competitive instruments than the NM-bank. Interestingly, the realization
of the leader-follower roles determines to what extent the M-bank separates the
two customer groups in equilibrium:
Proposition 1. Consider the sequential interest rate game in the case of asymmet-
ric monitoring investment and conditional on the realization of the leader-
follower roles. Then, in the unique Nash equilibrium
(a) The M-bank as the (price) leader quotes a single’ indifference rate’,
ind
G G M R R = , , for the entrepreneurs it classifies good and prices out the entre-
preneurs it classifies bad. The NM-bank names the monopoly rate, 
* R RNM = ,14
and finances at this rate all those entrepreneurs the M-bank has classified as
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where  )) ( , (
* B v R p  is the profit that the NM-bank earns from category B at the
monopoly rate;
(b)  as the (price) follower, the M-bank names 
0
) ( , , B v B M G M R R R = =  while the NM-
bank as the leader quotes 
0
) (B v NM R R = . The M-bank extends more loans than
the NM-bank, i.e., it captures all the customers it has identified as good and
half of those labeled bad. Only the M-bank makes positive expected profits.
The equilibrium interest rate is given by equation (3) (with p = B).
Proof. In Appendix 1.
The M-bank always earns positive expected profits (only) from the group of
good entrepreneurs. Despite this, good borrowers pay on average a lower interest
rate for their loans than bad customers. As the leader, the M-bank designs an in-
terest rate schedule that provides a price umbrella under which the NM-bank may
set its rate. This “bribery pricing” softens the undercutting strategy of the non-
monitoring follower and takes the form of pricing out the group of bad entrepre-
neurs. The result is close to the finding of Chan and Thakor (1987) who somewhat
surprisingly find that high-quality borrowers may be priced out of the market (but
not explicitly denied credit) despite a bank having idle deposits. This way of
pricing loans strongly differs from the situation in which M-bank is the follower:
in such a credit market loan customers are effectively offered a pooling contract
despite the bank’s ability to discriminate between them. Finally, from the per-15
spective of the NM-bank, there is a positive spillover from the monitoring invest-
ment of its rival: despite Bertrand competition and homogenous products the NM-
bank earns positive expected profits in equilibrium if a ˛ (0, 1], i.e., if there is a
positive probability that the M-bank is the leader.
The Monitoring Investment: Consider the simultaneous entry of the banks
and assume that the sunk investment generating monitoring services is feasible, i.e.,
that the fixed cost C
m is low enough to motivate the acquisition of the monitoring
ability at least by one bank. As long as this assumption holds, the following obtains:
Proposition 2. The monitoring model has an asymmetric sub-game perfect equi-
librium in which only one bank invests in monitoring.
The reason for this is that identical investments lead to Bertrand competition
and zero profits, whereas with one bank investing in monitoring, both make
strictly positive expected profits for a ˛ (0, 1]. Note that the equilibrium is unique
up to the reversal of banks’ indices.
10
We can now state the empirical predictions of the monitoring model. In a
given banking market, the equilibrium structure is asymmetric with one monitor-
ing bank. Note that irrespective of the nature of the sequential interest rate game,
M-bank ends up financing entrepreneurs with a lower average v than NM-bank.
Moreover, as long as there is a positive probability that the M-bank is the market
leader, it also finances its borrowers on average at a lower interest rate than the
NM-bank. As the M-bank’s customers have a lower average v than the customers
of the NM-bank, the M-bank will have lower bankruptcy costs (even) after con-
trolling for interest rates. Let us summarize these predictions as
                                                
10 We have also analyzed the case when banks enter the market sequentially, and the entry order is
random. In such a case, one can derive a threshold level that determines whether the bank entering
first or last invests (does not invest) in monitoring.16
Corollary 1. The M-bank charges on average lower interest rates and, condi-
tional on the interest rates charged, faces smaller credit losses relative to the
amount of loans extended, than the NM-bank.
11
2.3 The Product Differentiation Model
In this sub-section the sunk investment changes the way loan customers perceive
the services a banking firm provides. Both for simplicity and to create compara-
bility to the monitoring model we let the quality and availability of services of a
bank be a dichotomous variable, i.e., it is either s
q > 0 or 0. The cost of this in-
vestment is fixed, C
q > 0. None of the results in this section are due to the con-
strained choice set the banks face but rather can also be derived for a continuous
quality variable.
As previously, we next derive Nash equilibrium loan pricing strategies of
banks as a function of service quality investments and conditional on the realiza-
tion of the leader-follower roles. Finally, we find the sub-game perfect quality
investments.
Loan Pricing Under Symmetric Quality Investments: Since in this sec-
tion no monitoring is involved, the banks can observe neither v nor q characteriz-
ing the entrepreneurs and each bank can only quote one interest rate applying to
all entrepreneurs. It follows that if both (neither of the) banks have made the sunk
quality investment, there is no difference in customers’ quality perceptions. The
analysis then corresponds to the case of pure Bertrand competition, and the char-
acterization of the previous section holds.
                                                
11 These empirical predictions are not specific to our model of information acquisition. E.g. Rous-
seau’s (1998) model predicts that a bank that invests in new technology will (temporarily at least)
charge lower interest rates and have lower defaults. Also, Toivanen (1998) obtained equivalent
predictions about the effect of ex-ante monitoring in a Rothchild-Stiglitz-type model (of insurance
purchasing) with the possibility of firms investing in an information acquisition technology. In his
model, the monitoring insurer set lower premiums, and its customers had fewer accidents.17
Loan Pricing Under Asymmetric Quality Investments: In this sub-
section, we consider the asymmetric case in which only one bank has made the
quality related sunk investment. To begin with, let RH and RL denote the rates
charged by the high-quality (H-bank) and low-quality bank (L-bank), respec-
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the demands the banks face are  q q
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Bank i’s expected profits are given by
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where i = H, L, i „ j.
Due to the assumed sequential structure in interest rate setting, we (again)
have two asymmetric cases to consider: the cases of H-bank as the leader and
follower. Since by Assumption A2 v and q are independent, a service quality dif-
ference between banks does not (as such) change in a systematic way the expected
bankruptcy costs a bank faces. We have:18
Proposition 3. Consider the sequential interest rate game in the case of asymmet-
ric quality investment and conditional on the realization of the leader-follower
roles. Then, in the unique Nash equilibrium
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The associated loan demands are  2
1 = H D  and  2
1 = L D  for the H-bank and
the L-bank, respectively. Both banks make positive expected profits.
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The associated loan demands are  4
3 = H D and  4
1 = L D  for the high-quality
follower and the low-quality leader, respectively. Both banks make positive
expected profits.
A sketch of the proof can be found in Appendix 2 where we also give the
expressions for the expected equilibrium profits.
The Quality Investment: The analysis of the first stage of the vertical
product differentiation game closely parallels that of the monitoring game. Here,
we again assume that the sunk investment generating customer services is feasi-
ble, i.e., that its fixed cost C
q is low enough to induce one bank to invest in qual-19
ity. Because the two banks want to avoid entering price competition in Bertrand
fashion (in homogenous goods), it is easy to verify that with simultaneous entry,
there exist two asymmetric sub-game perfect equilibria:
Proposition 4. The vertical product differentiation model has an asymmetric sub-
game perfect equilibrium in which only one bank invests in quality. 
12
We can now turn to the empirical predictions of the market power version of
our model. As in the information acquisition version, the equilibrium structure of
a given banking market is asymmetric with one bank investing in high(er) loan
customer convenience. The H-bank on average ends up extending more loans and
financing entrepreneurs at a higher interest rate than the L-bank as long as
a ˛ [0, 1). Since the average v in the loan portfolios of both banks is v(GB), ex-
pected  bankruptcy costs (relative credit losses) are identical for the two banks
after controlling for interest rates. Let us summarize these empirical predictions as
Corollary 2. The H-bank charges higher interest rates and extends more loans
than the L-bank. Conditional on interest rates charged, both banks face identical
credit losses relative to the amount of loans extended.
In Section 4 we will turn to the empirical specification of our model. The
next Section discusses the market, and the data.
                                                
12 As in the monitoring model, when allowing for sequential entry, a threshold can be derived that
determines whether the bank entering first invests (does not invest) in quality.20
3 The Finnish Banking Market, and
the Cooperative Banks
3.1 The Data and Market Environment
Currently, partly as a result of the severe economic crisis in Finland in the early
90’s, the Finnish banking market is dominated by a few bank(ing group)s, one of
which consists of over 250 local cooperative banks. Our sample consists of these
banks (bar a few exclusions). The other traditional group of local banks, the sav-
ings banks, were the most prominent victim of the banking crisis, and have dra-
matically reduced in size as a consequence of a) a large merger between them and
b) a splitting of the merged bank between the remaining banking groups (in 1993).
As a result of mergers, the three main banking groups in Finland consist of the
group of cooperative banks on which we here concentrate, and two commercial
banks operating on the national level (i.e., that have a nationwide branch net-
work). Several studies (e.g. Koskenkylä and Vesala, 1994, Nyberg and Vihriälä,
1994, Davis, 1995) describe the events before and during the crisis, so we will
offer only a synopsis here. The volume of lending grew very rapidly (at times by
over 30% p.a.) in the late 80’s, partly due to financial market liberalization that
took place in the mid-80’s, partly due to an economic boom and lax monetary
policy. The boom ended in a collapse of asset values including real estate (a prime
source of collateral), and the economy shrank by 8% in 1992-1994. The economy
has been growing since then. The government bailout of banks has been estimated
to cost 50 billion FIM.21
Table 1. Nationwide branch networks of Finnish banks/banking
groups
Cooperative banks Merita Savings banks
1993 977 673 859
1994 993 776 248
1995 960 619 250
1996 893 479 242
Note: The figure of Savings banks in 1993 includes Savings Bank of Finland that was dismantled
by the end of 1993. Figures provided by the Finnish Bankers’ Association.
A comparison of the nation-wide branch networks of different banking groups
(see Table 1) reveals that as a group, the cooperative banks have by far the largest
branch network.
13 It is clearly larger than that of the other group of local banks,
the savings banks. The branch network of the largest Finnish bank, Merita, is
roughly two thirds or less of that of cooperative banks. This supports our (im-
plicit) assumption that these are banks that have made (larger) sunk investments.
14
Cooperative banks are mostly small, local banks that share a common or-
ganizational form and some institutions (they own a “central bank”, have an asso-
ciation that collects and disseminates information, and share other facilities usu-
ally found in the headquarters of a bank). Though most decision making power is
at the level of individual banks, group coherence and guidelines from the common
bodies affect sometimes strongly the behavior of individual banks. During the
boom years of the late 1980’s the cooperative banks were among the conservative:
as an example, the volume of their lending grew less than that of deposit banks on
average. They also experienced a smaller surge in the amount of bad loans during
the crisis in the early 1990’s (see, e.g., Koskenkylä and Vesala, 1994). Compared
to other banking groups, cooperative banks are clearly more focused on private
                                                
13  Of the comparison banks/banking groups, SBF was created by a merger of most local savings
banks, and was dismantled in 1993. Merita is the largest bank in Finland, formed through a merger
of the two (previously) largest banks. The branch networks of the two largest banks have been
added together in the table to allow comparisons, and as such Merita’s figures represent an upper
bound.22
customers, agriculture, and small business.
15 As a matter of fact, cooperative
banks are the biggest source of loans to agriculture.
16
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of bank level data
Variable definition  Mean St.Dev
DEP = The amount of deposits in year t, in Million FIM 293.56 486.47
LOAN = The amount of credit market loans in year t, in Million FIM 258.47 474.90
RD = Deposit interest rate in year t, calculated as interest rate ex-
penses/amount of deposits
0.0390 0.0184
RL = Loan interest rate in year t, calculated as interest rate income/amount
of outstanding loans
0.0933 0.0166
RDM = Interbank market deposit interest rate in year t, calculated as inter-
est rate expenses/amount of interbank market deposits
0.0650 0.0194
RDEP = Ratio of deposits to total funding 0.8551 0.0851
RLM = Interbank market loan interest rate in year t, calculated as interest
rate income/amount of outstanding interbank market loans
0.0556 0.0216
DEFR = Net charge-offs in year t/amount of outstanding loans in
 year t. In the estimations we use DEF=ln(0.000001+DEFR)
0.0141 0.0201
BRA = The number of branches at the beginning of year t divided by the
size (in square kilometers) of the market area
0.0079 0.0157
PERS = The amount of personnel expenses in year t, in Million FIM di-
vided by the number of branches at the beginning of year t
3.2621 6.2004
INEFF = Ratio of non-interest expenses in year t to non-interest revenues 0.7126 0.3012
SBFD = Dummy variable taking value of 1 for 1993-1995 if the bank
bought a part of the dismantled SBF-bank in 1993
0.3104 0.4628
NOTES: data provided by the Central Bank of Finnish Cooperative Banks; all data on bank level,
period 1992-1996. There are 250 banks in the data.
We have data on 250 cooperative banks over the period 1992-1996. We use a
relatively short and recent panel to exclude the 80’s, as the consensus view is that
banks then had not yet learned to operate in a liberalized environment. Another
reason is to allow time for banks to adjust their branch networks and personnel to
levels that are optimal under deregulated conditions; such adjustments necessarily
take time. The descriptive statistics of our sample are given in Table 2. Although
14 The second remaining nation-widely operating bank (besides Merita) is excluded from the table.
The reason for this is that it is the government owned former postal savings bank. It has clearly the
smallest number of own branches, but does provide (some) services through post offices.
15 The cooperative banks were originally established to channel government loans to small farms
which had difficulties getting loans from established banks. This was the main line of business
until the 1950’s (personal correspondence with Antti Kuusterä. Kuusterä is a historian who has
written a book on the history of savings banks, and is currently writing a book on the history of the
cooperative bank). The cooperative banks’ joint market share of SME lending is circa 40%.
16 The prevailing legislation has guaranteed the loans made to farms. These therefore do not ex-
pose banks to credit risk.23
these banks share several features, they are a rather diversified group: the smallest
bank’s loans amount to just over 6 Million FIM whereas the largest one’s are al-
most 4000 Million FIM (circa $800 Million using the average 1998 exchange
rate), with the mean at 257 Million.
17 On average the banks seem to have slightly
higher deposits (mean 284 Million) than loans. We have calculated four interest
rates; two are revenues (loans, and loans made (mainly) to other banks (inter-bank
lending)). The latter also contains revenues from investments in government
bonds etc.), two are costs (deposits, and loans from other banks (inter-bank bor-
rowing)). It is clear from Table 2 that the deposit interest rate is lower than that of
inter-bank borrowing, although there is bank-level variation. The reverse applies
for loans granted. Banks receive a clearly higher interest rate for loans granted to
customers, than from inter-bank lending. One of the variables of most interest in
this study is the level of default costs; they are measured by net charge-offs, i.e.,
the difference between loans actually written off and recoveries from loans previ-
ously categorized as uncollectible. As e.g. in Angbazo (1997), it will serve as a
proxy for asset quality and expected defaults (relative credit losses) and we have
calculated it as a percentage of loans given (excluding inter-bank loans). The per-
centage of default costs (DEFRit) varies between 0 and 18.5%, with a mean of
1%.
18 As pointed out earlier, in autumn 1993 the Savings Bank of Finland (SBF)
was dismantled through a sale of parts of its balance sheet (loans and deposits)
and branches to its rival banks (see, e.g. Vihriälä, 1997, for details). In our sample
17 There has been some consolidation within the cooperative banks. Whenever two or more banks
have merged, our data treats them as if they had merged prior to our observation period. A merger
dummy did not come up significant in the estimations.
18 There are a few observations with a negative DEF. These are the result of recoveries and banks
making reservations against future profits when customers default: in essence, the banks deduct
from current period’s profits their estimate of loss. If the loss is overestimated, the difference can
be deducted from profits later on.24
97 banks were involved in this unloading operation of SBF. To control in estima-
tions for the potential effects of this specific event, a SBF dummy (SBFD) is in-
troduced (see Table 2).
As a measure of service accessibility/quality and banks’ ability to gather lo-
cal information, we use the number of branches at the beginning of the year per
square kilometer (BRAit). It varies between 1.212*10
-5 and 0.154 (with a mean of
0.008). The idea behind this definition is that geographical proximity matters; if a
bank operates in a geographically large market where the customers are disbursed,
it is not enough to have a large branch at the center, if one wants to acquire infor-
mation. The same applies for investments in quality: customers may value a large,
geographically disbursed branch network that allows them easier access to serv-
ices. To take into account that given geographical proximity, a branch is more
effective in providing services and/or acquiring information, the more (and better
trained) staff it has, we use as another measure of sunk costs personnel expenses
per branch (PERSit). It varies from 0.018 to 61.014 Million FIM per branch.
The macroeconomic conditions vary markedly over our observation period.
We have therefore checked the year-wise descriptive statistics of our banking
variables for any anomalies and/or outliers (without finding any; see Appendix 2).
As to the operating environment of cooperative banks, they operate in dif-
ferent, non-overlapping markets. These markets are well defined, i.e., in line with
what the banks themselves do, a bank’s market is identified to consist of those
counties in which it has branches. Typically, there are only very few competitors
in the market so that competitive conduct is (in line with our theoretical model)
approximately duopolistic. Most often the rival is either a savings bank, or one of
the nationwide commercial banks, and only in larger cities is this approximation25
weaker. In Table 3 we present descriptive statistics of the markets the banks oper-
ate in. This demographic and sosio-economic data is available to us only for 1992-
1995. As can be seen, the markets vary in terms of population (and its density),
average wealth, in the number of farms (or the proportion of workforce employed
in agriculture), unemployment rate, and average education level.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of market level data
Variable definition  Mean St.Dev
POPULAT = Total population 18.197 36.575
DENS = Ratio of population to the size (in square kilometers) of the area 24.407 62.868
OWNH = Ratio of persons living in their own house to total population 0.298 0.025
FARM = Number of farms 484.445 516.401
WCAP = Taxable wealth per capita 52.248 11.773
UN = Unemployment rate 0.202 0.047
STUDENT = Ratio of students to total population 0.077 0.013
EDUC = Ratio of persons having an M.Sc./M.A. or a Ph.D. degree to total
population
0.057 0.018
AGRIC = Ratio of workforce working in farming, fishing and other agri-
cultural industries to total workforce
0.275 0.149
SERCON = Ratio of workforce working in services, construction business
and manufacturing industry to total workforce
0.322 0.106
OUTSIDE = Number of persons in employment inhabiting the market
area but working outside the area
0.155 0.087
NOTES: data provided by Statistics Finland; period 1992-1995
3.2 Cooperative Banks, Profit Maximization, and
Managerial Rent-seeking?
A special issue relating to our data that needs to be discussed is the ownership
form of the banks. One can plausibly argue that a cooperative bank’s objective
isn’t (necessarily) to maximize profits, and in our theoretical model we assumed
just that. There are several reasons why this seems to be a valid approach here.
Firstly, only a relatively small portion of these banks’ customers are actually26
members of the cooperative, i.e., owners of the bank.
19 Treating non-member
customers as if the bank was profit-maximizing (when serving them) seems to us
a good first approximation. Secondly, these banks seem to behave no differently
towards business customers than other banks, other than being more oriented to-
wards small businesses. This in turn has a historical explanation, as the large firms
in Finland have traditionally obtained finance through commercial banks. Thirdly,
if there are any differences between the lending practices of commercial and co-
operative banks, one would –both on historical and theoretical ground- expect the
latter to be more risk-averse than the former. One would hence a priori expect
them to be (if anything) more likely to invest in monitoring than commercial
banks. Fourthly, regarding investments in product quality, such investments could
well be in the interest of owner-customers, and a cooperative bank, too, would
have to cover the cost of such investments through higher price-cost margins.
It is generally thought that the (owners’) control of cooperatives’ manage-
ment is not as tight as that in profit maximizing institutions. Without attempting to
model this explicitly, one could build an alternative hypothesis from the starting
point that there are differences among cooperative banks in the extent to which
the management can engage in rent-seeking activities like empire-building. On the
one hand, if it is assumed that managing a larger bank leads to higher managerial
rents, this would imply that banks with less strict control would have more
branches and more (though not necessarily more qualified) personnel. On the
                                                
19 In 1998, less than 1/3 (less than 700 000 out of 2.1 million) of all ‘active’ customers were mem-
bers, despite strong growth in the 90’s (because of active recruiting: the cooperative banks’ target
is 1 million members by 2002). Some 5% of members are firms or societies (e.g. sports clubs).
The one-time membership fee was no less than 500 FIM (circa 100 USD) in 15% of the banks in
1992; currently, it is more than 500 FIM for 40% of the banks. We have been told that there is
strong variation between banks. Members have received miscellaneous benefits, the economically
most important probably being the possibility buy a ‘membership credit insurance policy’ to be
used as collateral. No clear policies have existed in terms of giving members loans on more bene-
ficial terms.27
other, if one (further) measure of bank size is its loan portfolio (balance sheet),
one could then argue that banks with less strict control would offer lower loan
interest rates so as to maximize the size of the loan portfolio. Such a model would
thus create a negative correlation between our measures of sunk costs and loan
interest rates, and make the managerial rents model empirically undistinguishable
from the information acquisition model with regard to the loan interest rate equa-
tion. It is however not clear that managerial rent seeking would have any implica-
tions on default costs, conditional on the loan interest rate(s) and the size of the
loan portfolio. One can therefore use the default equation to separate empire
building from information acquisition.
Another approach to acquire managerial rents would be to go for a ‘quiet
life’. The hypothesis would then be that such a bank makes small sunk invest-
ments and gives loans only to low-risk customers. This approach naturally raises
the question of how the bank would recognize the low-risk projects: it could use
e.g. collateral requirements. If leading a ‘quiet life’ is associated with few sunk
costs and ‘risk-averse’ lending practices, one would expect a positive correlation
between sunk costs and defaults. A quiet life, in any case, seems incompatible
with empire-building.
20
On balance, once one allows for the possibility of managerial rent seeking,
it seems sensible to allow for heterogeneity among managers with respect to how
they would exploit such opportunities. One could then hypothesize that all man-
agers of cooperative banks have rent-seeking opportunities and that managers
                                                
20 If one assumed that a manager can seek to build an empire and lead a quiet life simultaneously,
this would lead to a predicted negative correlation between the size of the loan book, and defaults.
Empire building implies a larger loan book; a quiet life that the bank (e.g. by requiring collateral)
chooses low-risk customers. It is not clear what the effect of sunk costs, conditional on the size of
the loan book, would be on default costs in such a setting. In any case, we find that (relative) de-
fault costs are increasing in the size of the loan book, rejecting the ‘building an empire and leading
a quiet life’-hypothesis.28
have idiosyncratic tastes, with some preferring a quite life and some empire-
building. Those of the first type would run small banks with small sunk invest-
ments, and give out loans only to low-risk customers; those of the latter type
would run large banks with large sunk investments, and give out a large number
of loans. Such a model would create a positive correlation between sunk invest-
ments and default costs, and allow us to empirically distinguish managerial rent-
seeking from information acquisition. It is not clear what the predicted correlation
between sunk costs and loan interest rates would be.
4 Empirical Model and Results
4.1 The Empirical Model
The empirical predictions of our theoretical model are expressed in the two cor-
ollaries in Section 2. There are two types of banks in a given banking market ac-
cording to our models: those that have made a sunk investment and those that
have not. Sunk investments may affect, firstly and most importantly for the em-
pirics, the relative amount of defaults (negatively in case of monitoring, not at all
in the case of market power investments), and secondly, the loan interest rate
(negatively in case of monitoring investments, positively in case of market power
investments). For the reasons discussed, we use the branch network and personnel
costs as measures of a bank’s sunk investments.
A central feature of our identification strategy is that our sample is special in
that the banks operate in a similar way, and that they operate in different, non-
overlapping markets. Our model predicts that in a given market there are banks
that do invest in sunk costs and banks that do not invest. Our data (see Table 1)29
supports the assumption that cooperative banks have made sunk investments. The
common ownership form and other shared features suggest that they use their
sunk investments for the same purpose(s), be it market power or information ac-
quisition, or something else. Having similar banks that operate in different mar-
kets enables us to avoid having non-investing and investing banks, as well as in-
vesting banks that use their investments for different purposes, in the sample.
21
Both of these would, according to our model, be unavoidable if our data consisted
of all banks in a given market.
We estimate the following dynamic equations for defaults (DEFit) and loan
interest rates (INTLit):
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where t = 1992, …,1996 and i = 1, …, 250. In these equations, the gjt (j = D, I) are
time dummies, and njit are i.i.d. error terms. The time dummies should capture the
effects of any economy-wide shocks on loan pricing and defaults. The mji are firm-
specific effects, possibly correlated with explanatory variables, which control for
bank and market specific unobservables. The most important market (bank) spe-
cific unobservables are the (average) riskiness of loan customers and the average
expected value of their projects, and (possibly) the scope for managerial rent-
seeking. To the extent to which behavioral patterns and competitive pressures of
the rival banks are time-invariant, mji controls also for the competitive situation of
the market. As in the company investment application of Bond and Meghir
                                                
21  Note that defining empirically a ‘non-investing’ bank is difficult as any retail bank needs at
least one branch, and some personnel to be operative.30
(1994), a further motivation for including bank-specific effects is that our sample
is non-random; it includes cooperative banks only. By allowing for fixed effects,
this particular persistent feature (and its implications for bank behavior) can to
some extent be controlled for.
As to explanatory variables, the once lagged endogenous variables are in-
cluded to capture any adjustment processes in banks’ pricing behavior and gradual
realization of loan losses. Variable LOANit is included to control for the size of a
bank’s loan book whereas INEFFit (ratio of non-interest expenses to non-interest
revenues) is included as a summary variable to control for i) the (in)efficiency of
management, ii) implicit interest rates (possibly) charged in the form of fees on
loans and commissions and iii) income smoothing. Inefficiency in management
potentially means higher operating costs (and therefore higher non-interest ex-
penses) whereas the practice of charging implicit interest rates shows up in non-
interest revenues. Income smoothing is present e.g. if loans are written off against
abnormally high non-interest income and low operating costs. As these (mixed)
effects are all represented by INEFFit, and since this summary variable also
probably proxies the extent to which banks are engaged in other operations be-
sides traditional loan business, its sign is not predicted. The cost of funding,
INTDit, (calculated as a weighted average of interest rates on inter-bank borrowing
and deposits) and the proxy for expected defaults, DEFit, are included in the inter-
est rate equation and they are predicted to have positive coefficients. As discussed
in the introduction, we do not model the deposit side, and deposit-market related
reasons for sunk investments. INTDit controls for such effects were they to exist.
Our theoretical model drives the inclusion of INTLit in the default equation, and its31
effect on defaults should be positive. The default equation also contains the SBF-
dummy.
22
All variables are in logs, and since there are observations with zero values
for DEFRit, we use DEFit  = ln(.000001+DEFRit). We did experiment with differ-
ent definitions of DEFit (linear, ln(1+DEFRit)), and our results are robust in this
sense. The nominal values of variables are used.
23
4.2 Econometric Methods and Instrument Choices
Our econometric model is dynamic; we have therefore chosen to estimate the
model using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators designed for
dynamic panel data (Arellano and Bond, 1991, Blundell and Bond, 1998, 1999).
24
We report two different GMM estimates: GMM-DIF is the Arellano-Bond (1991)
estimator, and GMM-SYS the Blundell and Bond (1998; see also Arellano and
Bover, 1995) estimator. Based on the standard assumptions on the covariance
structure of error components and on the initial conditions, the first one uses the
twice and more lagged levels of endogenous explanatory variables as instruments
in first-differenced equations. For predetermined variables, the once lagged levels
of variables are also valid instruments. The second utilizes the assumption that the
differences of the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the firm-specific
                                                
22  The SBF-dummy was never significant in the interest rate equation and was therefore dropped.
23 The reason for using nominal values is that i) it is not clear what deflator to use (e.g. real estate
values both declined and increased during the observation period), ii) inflation was very low dur-
ing the (short) observation period. We have however estimated the base specification using vari-
ables deflated by the consumer price index, and the cost of living index. The results did not
change.
24 Estimating a static model with Error Component 2SLS (Baltagi, 1981) produced similar results,
but auto-correlation tests for the estimated residual suggested mixed conclusions. It should be
noted, however, that these estimations were based on a set of covariance restrictions that were
somewhat stronger than the ones adopted in this paper. These (exogeneity) restrictions were made
to obtain valid instruments, and we did not test for their validity in that framework.32
effect (and a further initial condition assumption). This allows the use of suitable
lagged first differences as instruments for the equations in levels. It has been
shown (Blundell and Bond, 1998, 1999) both in Monte Carlo studies and empiri-
cally, that especially when the levels are weak instruments for the first differenced
variables, considerable efficiency gains and avoidance of finite sample bias can be
achieved by adding these extra moment conditions. Such a situation may arise
especially when the time series are persistent. This is the case for a number of
variables in our data, particularly for PERSit, BRAit and LOANit.
In the GMM-DIF estimations of the default and loan equations, we have i)
allowed for the fact that the lagged dependent variable is necessarily correlated
with the bank-specific effects and ii) assumed that the levels of any other ex-
planatory variable are potentially correlated with the bank-specific effects. In the
default equation, the lagged dependent variable and LOANit are potentially corre-
lated with nDit, i.e., endogenous. Since DEFit represents realized loan defaults, the
other remaining explanatory variables in this equation are assumed to be prede-
termined w.r.t. nDit. For the loan interest rate equation, a more conservative ap-
proach was adopted; there, all the explanatory variables are treated as endoge-
nous. Based on this classification, the instruments used for GMM-DIF are thus the
observations on explanatory variables dated t-2 and earlier if the variable is en-
dogenous, and t-1 and earlier if it is predetermined.
In the GMM-SYS estimations, we initially assumed that the differences of
all explanatory variables in both interest rate and default equations are uncorre-
lated with the bank-specific effects and specifically, that the deviations of the ini-
tial conditions from the (long-run) mean of the process are uncorrelated with the
mean itself (Blundell and Bond 1998, 1999). The instruments used in the levels33
equations are the observations on the differenced explanatory variables dated t-1
(e.g. Dxt-1) if the variable is endogenous and t if it is predetermined.
The first observation of our sample is however special; on the one hand, in
1992 the banking crisis hit its deepest point, and for instance defaults for the
whole Finnish banking sector reached their peak (during that year, 4,8% of loans
were written off; see Davis, 1995); on the other, the process of dismantling SBF
took place in 1992 and 1993. Interestingly, the default costs for our sample were
at their lowest in 1992, relative to loans extended (which also were at their mini-
mum). This casts doubts on the validity of the initial conditions restrictions, at
least for the DEFit and LOANSit variables. Indeed, when we tested for all the addi-
tional moment conditions used in the levels equations, a difference-Sargan statis-
tic rejected their validity at 1% level (p-value .0083) in the interest rate equation
and yielded a p-value of .105 in the default equation. There are reasons to suspect
that DLOANi,t-1 and DDEFi,t-1 are the driving forces behind the rejection (and the
marginality of validity). As a matter of fact, the validity of the additional moment
conditions used in the levels equations is not rejected when both DLOANi,t-1 and
DDEFi,t-1 are dropped from the instrument set (the p-values for difference-Sargan
tests are .211 and .239 in the default and interest rate equations, respectively). We
therefore decided to err on the conservative side and excluded them from the in-
strument set of both equations in the estimations that follow.34
4.3 Empirical Results
The results to be reported are based on the one-step GMM estimators.
25 The as-
ymptotic variance matrix for them is more reliable than for the two-step GMM
(see, e.g. Blundell and Bond, 1998).
The interest rate estimation results are presented in Table 4. Comparing first
the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable, we observe that the OLS coeffi-
cient (Column (1)) is the largest, the Within coefficient (Column (2)) the smallest,
and the GMM estimates (GMM-DIF in Column (3), GMM-SYS in (4)) are in
between.
26 These follow closely the expected pattern, and that reported by Blun-
dell and Bond (1999) in their production function and Monte Carlo studies.
Turning to the other parameters, the OLS and Within estimates differ sometimes
substantially from the GMM estimates. The GMM-DIF and GMM-SYS estimates
are reasonably close to each other, but the latter seem to be more efficient as ex-
pected. Concentrating then on the GMM-SYS estimates of our base specification
(Column (4)), we find that expected default costs (DEFit) do not affect interest
rates, but that interest rate costs (INTDit) do have a positive effect. The long-run
cost-of-financing elasticity of loan interest rates is .148. The coefficient of loan
book size (LOANit) is positive and has a p-value of 0.09. The summary variable
INEFFit obtained a negative and significant coefficient. Our variables of most
interest, BRAit and PERSit, both carry negative and significant coefficients, im-
plying that banks with a larger branch network and more human capital at branch
level charge lower interest rates. These results are in line with the information
                                                
25 The estimates have been produced using Arellano-Bond DPD98, kindly provided by Steve
Bond. For reference, we also report OLS and Within Groups estimates. The consistency of these
two estimators requires that all explanatory variables are strictly exogenous w.r.t. njit.
26 Notice that the number of observations varies over estimation methods as GMM-DIF loses one
year (cross-section) due to constructing lags and a second year for first-differencing. GMM-SYS
loses only one cross-section.35
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(.0384)
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(.0199)
-
OWNH - - - - - - .0998
(.0790)
-
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(.0330)
WCAP - - - - - - - -.0011
(.0173)
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NOTES: The GMM-estimates are all one-step. Numbers reported are coefficient and asymptotic
standard errors (s.e.). Reported standard errors are robust to general cross-section and time-series
heteroskedasticity. Nobs is the number of useable observations. All estimations include time dum-
mies.
- Sargan is a test of the overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimators. Reported numbers are
p-values.




 order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals (except
for OLS and Within estimations, in which the tests are for levels residuals); they are asymptotically
distributed N(0,1); (p-values)
- Wald1 = a Wald test of joint significance of explanatory variables (p-value)
- Wald2 = a Wald test of joint significance of time dummies (p-value)
- Wald3 = a Wald test of joint significance of BRA and PERS terms (p-value)36
acquisition model (and the empire-building hypothesis), and reject the market
power model.
27 The estimated elasticities for BRAit and PERSit are small. This
indicates that the costs of information acquisition in terms of having to offer lower
interest rates to attract those customers the bank has identified as ‘good’ are low.
Turning to the test statistics, the first differenced residuals display first order
auto-correlation as expected, and no second order auto-correlation. The Sargan
tests do not reject the overidentifying restrictions in GMM-DIF or GMM-SYS
estimations. A Wald statistic testing the joint significance of BRAit and PERSit
rejects the Null of them not being jointly different from zero.
We have conducted a number of robustness tests. Firstly, as the time period
covered by our data starts with a recession and ends with strong growth, we tested
for stability of our coefficients over time. This was done by introducing an indi-
cator variable for the years 95-96 (those with positive GDP growth), and inter-
acted it with other variables. We could not reject the Null that the coefficients are
stable over time (p-value: .137). Secondly, as the banks differ substantially in size,
we tested whether our coefficients for central variables, i.e., BRAit, PERSit,
INTLi,t-1 and DEFit, are sensitive to the size of the banks. We introduced an indi-
cator variable that took the value unity if the sum of LOANit and interbank lending
(e.g. total loans) was above mean (and as an alternative, median) and zero other-
wise, and interacted it with the aforementioned variables. Again, the Null could
not be rejected at conventional levels (p-value: .270). Thirdly, earlier literature
(Fama, 1985 and Vale, 1993 in particular) has suggested that banks can use de-
                                                
27 It is worth noticing that the Within estimate produces positive and significant coefficients for
BRA and PERS (OLS for PERS), which would support the market power hypothesis and reject the
information acquisition hypothesis. We have however tested the Null of BRA and PERS being
predetermined against the alternative of them being endogenous. Using a difference Sargan test we
rejected the Null at 5% level (p-value was .034). Based on this, the consistency of OLS and Within
Groups estimators can be questioned.37
posits to monitor the cash flow of their loan customers, and thereby gain informa-
tion on the riskiness of loans. We tested whether this affects loan interest rates by
including the variable RDEPit, defined as the ratio of deposits made by customers
to the sum of customer deposits and interbank borrowing. Treating RDEPit as en-
dogenous, we find that it has no effect on loan interest rates of banks.
The estimates using the whole panel do not have exogenous variables, as
market characteristics are currently only available up to 1995. In Column (6) we
therefore reproduce the estimation of Column (4) (GMM-SYS), using 92-95 data.
As the column reveals, our results are robust to excluding 1996, a year with a
strongly growing economy. In Columns (7) and (8) we add different market char-
acteristics into the model. In these exercises, the market level variables are treated
as strictly exogenous (and they are only used to instrument themselves). Adding a
group of demographic variables (population density (DENSit, see Table 3 for defi-
nitions), education (EDUCit) and home ownership (OWNHit)) leads to higher ab-
solute values for BRAit and PERSit coefficients. Two of the three market charac-
teristics obtain statistically significant coefficients. Adding controls for unem-
ployment (UEit), wealth per capita (WCAPit) and agriculture (AGRICit) drives
PERSit into insignificance, and BRAit is only marginally significant. However,
none of these three controls carries a statistically significant coefficient. We con-
clude that our results on the negative effects of branch network density and bank
human capital on loan interest rates are robust.
Turning then to the results for the default equation in Table 5 (the column
order is as in Table 4), we find that the coefficients of the lagged dependent vari-
able generated by different estimation methods follow the expected pattern, with
the GMM-SYS estimate being .19. Again concentrating on the GMM-SYS esti-
mates (base specification in Column (4)) we find first of all that an increase in the38











































































































































DENS - - - - - - -2.8371
(1.6670)
-
EDUC - - - - - - .9744
(.9063)
-
OWNH - - - - - - 7.0733
(3.3794)
-
UE - - - - - - - .1693
(1.3596)
WCAP - - - - - - - 1.5145
(.8060)
AGRIC. - - - - - - - .4435
(.3559)
Nobs. 1000 1000 750 1000 1000 750 750 750








































































NOTES: see Table 4.39
loan interest rate (INTLit) increases the amount of defaults significantly (the long-
run interest rate elasticity of defaults is 8.126). This is in line with our (and oth-
ers’) theoretical models. Even after controlling for this effect, banks with larger
loan books have larger relative default costs. This could reflect the specificity of
our sample period and a situation where small banks chose their customers more
carefully. It is well known that banks operating in the larger cities made larger
relative credit losses during the banking crisis than banks operating in small(er)
municipalities.  However, it is also possible that the result is not period specific. It
implies that conditional on the level of sunk investments, a larger loan book (im-
plying a higher number of granted loans) leads to larger default costs. Decreasing
returns to scale in the information acquisition technology would lead to the result.
The summary variable INEFFit has no effect on default costs, but we find that
banks to which former savings banks’ branches have been merged have lower
credit losses. A possible explanation for this is that only healthier (the dismantling
of SBF took place during 1992-1993, in the midst of the banking crisis) coopera-
tive banks were willing (alternatively, were allowed to by the government) to take
on former savings banks’ branches. Also, as a part of the dismantling of SBF, its
worst loans were transferred into a government run ‘bad’ bank, and the banks
buying parts of SBF only took on their books loans deemed healthy. Most signifi-
cantly, however, we find that both variables capturing sunk costs have significant
negative effects on default costs, supporting the information acquisition hypothe-
sis. The estimated long-run elasticities are –2.15 for branch density and –4.08 for
personnel costs. These results reject both the market power model (and also the
managerial rents-hypotheses).
Turning briefly to the test statistics, they display similar patterns as in the
interest rate equation. In particular, the Sargan tests do not reject the overidenti-40
fying restrictions in GMM-DIF or GMM-SYS estimations and a Wald statistic
rejects the Null of BRAit and PERSit being not jointly different from zero.
We conducted the same robustness tests as with the interest rate equation,
with similar results bar one exception.
28 The RDEPit variable (see Column (5))
obtained a negative and significant coefficient (-8.34) when added to the specifi-
cation and treated as being endogenous and correlated in levels with the bank-
specific effects. This provides evidence that banks can indeed use information
obtained from monitoring their customers’ cash flows to decrease their credit
losses. Concurrently and independently, Mester et al. (1998) have obtained a
similar result using data on U.S. checking accounts. Adding RDEPit reduces the
absolute size of the BRAit and PERSit coefficients to -.91 and –2.38, respectively.
They do remain statistically significant, however.
Excluding the 1996 data does not materially affect the results (Column (6)).
Adding exogenous control variables to the specification changes somewhat the
BRAit and PERSit coefficients; however, only two of the six exogenous regressors
(OWNHit and AGRICit respectively in Columns (7) and (8)) obtain statistically
significant coefficients. Adding DENSit, EDUCit and OWNHit renders the BRAit
coefficient significant at only 12% level; BRAit and PERSit are still jointly signifi-
cant. Adding UEit, WCAPit and AGRICit results in a insignificant BRAit coefficient,
but BRAit and PERSit are still jointly significant.
As a last robustness check, we tested whether future default costs (above
and beyond one year) are affected by current values of BRAit and PERSit. The aim
is to control for the definition of DEFit. It is calculated using the net charge-offs
                                                
28 When using the median of (LOANit + interbank loans) as the size criterion (instead of the mean
of (LOANit + interbank loans) criterion), we could not reject the Null that large banks have differ-
ent BRAit, PERSit, DEFi,t-1 and INTLit coefficients than small banks. This was however entirely
driven by the coefficient of the interaction variable obtained by DEFi,t-1 times the dummy (the
other interactions carried insignificant coefficients), and we therefore do not report these results.41
(default costs) of the current period, in line with our theoretical model. However,
in reality, banks incur default costs from loans made in previous periods as it
takes time before loan risks realize and before loans are written off. The assump-
tion in our monitoring model is that sunk costs are investments to improve bank’s
ability to ex ante identify projects with small liquidation costs and/or high resale
value. It could be that sunk costs are instead used to improve banks’ interim and
ex post monitoring ability (costly state verification). To some extent we control
for this in all estimations by using the number of branches at the beginning of the
year when computing BRAit. One could however argue that if only current levels
of BRAit and PERSit (as defined) affected DEFit negatively, it would not be clear
which of the two phenomena is the one generating the results. Finding that lagged
values of BRA and PERS variables affect current values of DEFit negatively
would provide additional support for our assumption of ex ante monitoring.
The results of the estimations are reported in Table 6, where we have used
the GMM-SYS estimator and the same instruments as above. The first Column
reproduces our base specification on 1992-96 data. Column (2) replaces the cur-
rent values of BRAit and PERSit with once lagged values (BRAi,t-1 and PERSi,t-1). In
Column (3), BRAit and PERSit have been lagged two years, and Column (4) re-
ports a specification with both current and once lagged values of BRA and PERS
variables. The idea behind including them is that in any given year, DEFit consists
of defaulted loans granted in different years. As the relationship between these
explanatory variables and DEFit could well be nonlinear, and because the current
and lagged levels of BRAit and PERSit are relatively strongly (auto)correlated, we42
Table 6. Default cost estimations (1992–1996) with
lagged BRA and PERS































































BRA t-2 - - -1.4877
(.6666)
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2 - - - - .0031
(.0214)
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(.1158)
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NOTES: see Table 4; All estimations include the SBF-dummy;
Wald3 = a Wald test of joint significance of all BRAs and PERSs, including the lagged
ones, in the equation (p-value).43
 experimented with including the squared (logs of) lagged BRA and PERS (Col-
umn (5)).
Using the once lagged values we find that both BRAi,t-1 and PERSi,t-1 carry
imprecisely measured negative coefficients. The p-value of a test of joint signifi-
cance is 0.138. Lagging the variables twice results in negative coefficients; that of
BRAi,t-2 is significant, and they are also jointly significant. In Column (4) we find
that current values of BRAit and PERSit obtain negative and significant, and lagged
values positive and insignificant coefficients. Column (5) shows that both current
values and the lagged squared values of the PERS variable carry negative and sig-
nificant coefficient. The coefficient of the lagged squared BRA variable is positive
but insignificant. Though not as strong as those reported in Table 5, these results
support the assumption of out theoretical model that sunk costs contribute to the
ex ante information acquisition ability of banks.
5 Conclusions
The main objective of this paper was to shed light on whether banks use their
sunk investments for information acquisition, or for obtaining market power. Our
theoretical model allows us to study such investments within a common modeling
framework. Different types of sunk investments have very different empirical im-
plications. Our main interest was on sunk investments’s effect on banks’ lending
quality (i.e, on the riskiness of the bank’s loan portfolio) and the interest rate
charged by the bank. Our theoretical prediction is that information acquisition
leads to a lower amount of defaults and to a lower interest rate margin. Market
power investments, in contrast, have no direct effect on default costs (an indirect
positive effect through the interest rate), and lead to higher interest rates.44
We tested these theories on panel data covering 250 Finnish local banks and
five years. The fact that these banks operate in non-overlapping regional markets
means that the equilibrium level of investments varies over banks, thus allowing
us to identify the effects of sunk investments on bank performance. The non-
random nature of the sample, and the shared features and institutions of the coop-
erative banks allowed us to assume that they use their fixed investments for the
same purpose. They also simultaneously enabled us to avoid the problem (pre-
dicted by our theory) of having both investing and non-investing banks in our
sample.
We found persistence in both loan interest rates and default costs. Loan in-
terest rates are an increasing function of deposit interest rates. Unsurprisingly,
higher interest rates increase default costs. Banks with larger loan books have
higher (relative) default costs. We found that banks’ investments in both branch
network density and human capital (personnel) contribute to the information ac-
quisition ability of banks as both loan interest rates and default costs are decreas-
ing in these variables. These findings thus lead us to reject the market power hy-
pothesis (and also the most obvious versions of managerial rent seeking explana-
tions). In addition, we find evidence supporting the hypothesis (Fama, 1985) that
banks use deposits to monitor the cash flow of customers, and are thereby able to
decrease the amount of credit losses. These results were robust to a number of
experiments. In particular, we found that lagged values of branch network density
and personnel have a similar effect on current default costs. These findings sup-
port the assumption of our theoretical model that banks use sunk investments for
ex ante information acquisition, rather than for ex post monitoring.45
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Appendix 1. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1, Part (a): To begin with, note that the no-cross-
substitution assumption implies that 
0
) ( , p v p M R R ‡  holds for  { } B G p , ˛ . Then, for
a sub-game perfect solution, consider the follower. Whenever feasible, the non-
monitoring follower will optimally undercut either both offers or the higher offer
of the leader depending on which action yields higher profits. If this strategy is
not feasible, the follower tries at least to match one of the offers so as to split the
entrepreneurs in this category just to remain in business. We can now turn to the
leader’s strategy:
Claim 1. The monitoring leader cannot earn strictly positive expected prof-
its from both entrepreneur categories in equilibrium.
To prove the claim, suppose for contradiction that the opposite holds. Then
it must be the case that 
0
) ( , p v p M R R >  holds for  { } B G p , ˛ . But for any such inter-
est rate pair, the follower will optimally undercut either both offers or the higher
offer depending on which action yields higher profits, and capture all the entre-
preneurs or those to whom the higher rate was quoted, thus contradicting the as-
sumption. Only when 
0
) ( , GB v G M R R £  and 
0
) ( , B v B M R R = , there exists no such strictly
profitable undercutting opportunity for the non-monitoring follower. To see this,
note that should the follower undercut either loan rate, it would make non-positive
expected profits. In this case, however, zero-profits are earned by the leader from
the customers labeled bad, which again contradicts the assumption. Claim 1 hence
holds.
The implication of the above is that the optimal strategy of the monitoring
leader involves “bribery pricing” so as to maximize its profits from the borrower
category from which it (potentially) can earn strictly positive profits. Given the48
under-cutting option of the follower, the leader can compute and announce an
indifference rate at which the follower is indifferent between trying to become the
sole financier of GB (by undercutting both of the offers of the leader), and fi-
nancing solely those entrepreneurs to whom the leader quotes a higher interest
rate. Consider a strategy where such an indifference rate, 
ind
p R  , is quoted for cate-
gory  { } B G p , ˛  and where the other category p´ „ p is priced out by quoting an
interest rate that is strictly higher than 
* R  (i.e., the monopoly rate). If such an
interest rate pair was observed by the follower, its optimal response would be to
quote 
* R RNM =  since (by construction) it has no profit incentive to undercut the
offer made by the leader for p. The follower would end up financing category p´
at rate 
* R . This implies that if the category to which no interest rate is quoted by
the leader is B (i.e. if p´ = B), the indifference rate, 
ind
G R  (quoted for the good by
the monitoring leader) is found by solving the equation
)) ( , ( ) 1 ( ) exp( 1 ))( ( ) ( (
* B v R R GB v x E
ind
G p r l = + - - - - (1.1)
( ) ) 1 ( )) exp( 1 ))( ( ) ( ( )) ( 1 ( )) ( , (   where
* * r l p + - - - - - = R B v x E s G B v R
m .
Alternatively, if p´ = G, the relevant indifference rate, 
ind
B R  , is solved from
equation
)) ( , ( ) 1 ( ) exp( 1 ))( ( ) ( (
* G v R R GB v x E
ind
B p r l = + - - - - (1.2)
( ) ) 1 ( )) exp( 1 ))( ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( , (   where
* * r l p + - - - - = R G v x E s G G v R
m . In the above
equations,  )) ( , (   and   )) ( , (
* * G v R B v R p p  are the expected profits for the follower
from cases p´ = B and p´ = G, respectively. Since banks’ expected profits are in-
creasing in the loan interest rate within any given entrepreneur category, in either
case the monitoring leader’s profit from p are higher the higher is the indifference
interest rate at which it provides financing for p . The observation that the indif-49
ference interest rates are higher the higher are the expected profits of the follower
from cases p´ = B and p´ = G, allows us to write down
Claim 2. It is optimal for the monitoring leader to price out p´ as this maxi-
mizes the follower’s profit from this entrepreneur category and therefore also the
associated indifference interest rate that the monitoring bank can charge from p.
Note in particular, that if the leader quoted the monopoly interest rate for
category p´, the associated indifference interest rate would be strictly lower than it
would be if a marginally higher interest rate were quoted.
Claim 3. The optimal (bribery) pricing by the monitoring leader involves
pricing out bad entrepreneurs (p´= B) and quoting the indifference rate defined by
equation (1.1) for good entrepreneurs (p = G). The best response by the follower
to such an interest rate schedule is to name the monopoly interest rate.
To prove the claim, note that the expected profits for the monitoring leader
from the case in which the indifference rate was quoted for good entrepreneurs,
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Since v is uniformly distributed, it is easy to verify, firstly, that
. v s s G v GB v v s B v s G v





1 = = + = =
and then, secondly, that
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As the best response by the follower to 
ind
G R  is to quote the monopoly rate, claim
3 follows.50
Thus, in equilibrium, the leader ends up financing entrepreneurs it classified
good whereas the follower provides financing for entrepreneurs classified bad by
the monitoring leader. This completes the proof of part (a) of Proposition 1.
QED.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1, Part (b): Recall that the no-cross-substitution
assumption implies that 
0
) ( , B v B M R R ‡ . We begin by claiming that the non-
monitoring leader cannot announce an interest rate (stricly) below 
0
) (B v R . For
proof, suppose it did and offered an interest rate marginally below 
0
) (B v R . The
follower’s best response would clearly be to offer exactly the same interest rate
for all good entrepreneurs and any rate higher than or equal to
0
) (B v R  to those it
labeled bad. From this and Assumption A3 it follows that all the good entrepre-
neurs (in category G) would prefer the monitoring follower to the leader. This
means that at any rate below 
0
) (B v R  the leader finances only those allocated in B by
the monitoring bank at an interest rate implying negative expected profits for it.
Hence the claim must hold in equilibrium.
Note that if the non-monitoring leader tried to set an interest rate higher than
0
) (B v R  it would provide an incentive for the follower to undercut such an offer and
thus the leader would end up funding no entrepreneurs. From this it follows that
the leader cannot do better than to offer 
0
) (B v NM R R = . The optimal strategy for the
follower is then to charge the very same interest rate from all the entrepreneurs,
namely 
0
) ( , , B v B M G M R R R = = . This implies that 
0
) (B v R  is quoted by both banks and
to each entrepreneur category in equilibrium, and that B is split between the two
banks whereas the monitoring leader finances G. It follows that both banks earn51
zero expected profits from lending to B while the monitoring bank earns positive
profits from lending G.  QED.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3 (Sketch). Details are omitted for brevity. The
derivation of the Nash equilibrium loan rates is, however, standard, i.e., one first
solves the follower’s problem for any given interest of the leader and then utilizes
the derived best response function when solving the leader’s maximization prob-
lem. The equilibrium demands are found by computing the identity of the mar-
ginal type at the equilibrium interest rates. Given the equilibrium interest rates and









































































In this appendix, we discuss the year-wise descriptive statistics and check them
for any anomalies and/or outliers. In Table 1.1. we report mean, median, standard
deviation, minimum and maximum value for each year and variable. All figures
are in Finnish markka and in nominal terms.
The mean amount of loans extended was the lowest in 1992, and increased
thereafter. The same applies for deposits. All four interest rates (loan, inter-bank
loan, deposit, and inter-bank deposit) decrease every year. The mean loan interest
rate goes from 12.03% in 1992 to 7.39% in 1996. Our calculated cost of funds
(INTD) decreases from 7.43% to 2.49%. In line with this, the ratio of deposits
from customer to total deposits (RDEP) increases over time. In 1992, the mean of
RDEP is 82.56%, and peaks in 1996 at 88.26%. Interestingly, and contradicting
industry figures, the default costs were at their lowest in 1992; the default costs of
the whole banking industry peaked that year. At their highest (in 1994), the mean
default costs were 1.77% of loans extended. This masks wide bank-level variation
however. Each year, some banks report zero default costs. At the same time, the
maximum default costs vary between 8.65% (in 1996) and 17.05% (in 1993) of
loans extended.
During the observation period, banks were changing their branch networks,
and adjusting the number of employees. The cooperative banks are generally held
to have been the slowest to make such adjustments, and our numbers bear that out.
The mean number of branches decreases from 3.6 in 1992 to 2.9 in 1996, but in-
creases first in between. Personnel costs are very stable, with the mean at around
5.5 Million FIM. Unsurprisingly therefore, personnel costs per branch exhibit an
increasing trend.53
Checking the year-wise minima and maxima for each bank-level variable
revealed no outliers in the sense that the year-to-year changes in these were
roughly proportional to the changes in sample first moments. The only extreme
value that changes markedly is that of INEFF: whereas the sample moments are
stable, the maximum decreases from 3.09 in 1993 to 1.52 in 1994. Sample second
moments of all bank-level variables are remarkably stable over the observation
period, especially in light of the changing macroeconomic conditions.
Table 1.1  Yearly descriptive statistics of bank variables
Deposits, 1000 000 FIM
year Mean Med. S.d. Min. Max.
1992 241.5775 123.641 384.2059 11.0846 2969.309
1993 258.4518 131.3481 416.6836 12.6948 3244.395
1994 314.6419 159.4877 524.9837 13.6927 4194.973
1995 324.3661 162.7845 535.9779 13.8813 4226.674
1996 328.7691 160.7896 544.3834 14.1277 4285.681
LOAN
year Mean Med. S.d. Min. Max.
1992 242.4031 108.1146 439.4923 6.3583 3296.819
1993 247.7302 111.2777 451.8151 7.0851 3358.258
1994 275.5024 122.9388 515.3931 7.8430 3875.546
1995 264.1695 119.7953 485.1355 7.7068 3734.778
1996 262.5445 119.4842 481.9306 7.2394 3800.051
Deposit interest rate (from customers only)
year Mean Med. S.d. Min. Max.
1992 0.070867 0.0707 0.004618 0.0565 0.0831
1993 0.047007 0.0463 0.004034 0.0365 0.0611
1994 0.028483 0.0284 0.002412 0.0225 0.0364
1995 0.027876 0.0277 0.002588 0.0210 0.0377
1996 0.020888 0.0207 0.001649 0.0178 0.0288
Loan interest rate (to customers only)
year Mean Med. S.d. Min. Max.
1992 0.1203 0.1207 0.005476 0.1011 0.1344
1993 0.0996 0.1004 0.007272 0.0558 0.1164
1994 0.0853 0.0852 0.004791 0.0708 0.1059
1995 0.0874 0.0873 0.004120 0.0742 0.1005
1996 0.0739 0.0736 0.004211 0.0636 0.0990
Inter-bank lending interest rate
year Mean Med. S.d. Min. Max.
1992 0.0818 0.0789 0.025919 0.0297 0.1333
1993 0.0716 0.0721 0.018423 0.0254 0.1163
1994 0.0581 0.0580 0.011537 0.0294 0.0912
1995 0.0573 0.0571 0.011230 0.0319 0.0970
1996 0.0559 0.0561 0.009925 0.0277 0.0885